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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

within the county's development plan.
The CDC defined a riparian zone as "the area, adjacent to a water
By
area, which is characterized by moisture dependent vegetation."
definition, all riparian zones bordered other significant natural resources,
including wetlands.
In rejecting the LUBA ruling, this court construed section 422-3.3A as
protecting only those riparian zones that were adjacent to significant natural
resources specifically identified under the Community Plan. The court
found this construction to be reasonable considering the natural relationship
of riparian zones to other water areas, identifiable under section 422-2.
The court thus understood the intention of the section was to apply only to
those riparian zones that bore some relationship to an identified protected
area such as wetlands. Since the plot of land in dispute did not border an
identified habitat and was not itself an identified habitat, it was not afforded
protection under section 422-3.3A.
Although section 422-3.3A addressed developmental restrictions on
riparian zones without specifically requiring that they be listed in a
Community Plan, the court held that this provision was nevertheless
subject to such a restriction under section 422-2. Contrary to the LUBA
interpretation, the court held that other than the exception of riparian zones
adjacent to identified significant natural resources, all lands that were not
distinguished within the Community Plans were not subject to regulation
under any provision of section 422. LUBA held that the limitations
imposed by section 422-2 applied to all the subsequent provisions of that
section. The parcel of land slated for development by the county, by
limitation, was not subject to CDC protection. Therefore, the court found
that LUBA erred in prohibiting the county's approval of the subdivision
upon the land at issue.
Jason Wells

Shasta View Irrigation Dist. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 986 P.2d 536
(Or. 1999) (holding that the irrigation district was a public corporation,
which was exempt from general statutes of limitation, but not exempt from
statute of ultimate repose in products liability action).
The members of the Shasta View Irrigation District ("Shasta"),
organized and formed in Oregon on December 5, 1917, own irrigable land
within the geographic boundaries of Shasta and farm or lease their land to
others. As part of a betterment project, Shasta replaced over twenty-one
miles of existing unlined canals with buried pressure pipeline. Shasta
received a sixty-five year loan for the work from the United States Bureau
of Reclamation, with a specification requirement that the pressure pipe
used in constructing the irrigation system must last for at least sixty-five
years.
Shasta used Techite, a brand of reinforced plastic mortar pipe
manufactured by Amoco Reinforced Plastics Co. ("Amoco"), in the
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construction of over half the pipeline. Shasta ordered the Techite from
Amoco between June and September 1973. The installation of the pipe
took place between February 1974 and June 1974. In July 1975, Shasta
accepted the irrigation system as complete and operational.
According to Shasta, the Techite pipe failed twenty-six times since
1978, with two failures occurring before July 1, 1982. In 1989, the Shasta
board of directors voted to pursue legal action against Amoco, as
manufacturer of the Techite pipe.
In 1994, Shasta brought a products liability action against Amoco in
state court. Amoco removed the action to federal district court on the basis
of diversity. Amoco then filed a motion for summary judgment claiming
Shasta's claims were statutorily time barred. The district court granted
summary judgment in Amoco's favor and Shasta appealed. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit presented certified questions
of Oregon law to the Oregon Supreme Court.
The supreme court first addressed whether an irrigation district could
be considered a 'public corporation' for purposes of applying the
exemption to applicable limitations set out in Or. Rev. Stat. section
12.250. This statute exempted actions brought by public corporations, as
well as state and county actions, from general statutes of limitations. Since
the formation of the irrigation district fostered the public's beneficial use of
water and was located on public property and its officers were public
officers, elected by the legal voters of the irrigation district, the irrigation
district was a public corporation for the purposes of section 12.250.
Next, the court addressed whether the above-mentioned exemption
applied to a statute of repose under Or. Rev. Stat. section 30.905(1). This
statute provided that a products liability civil action must be commenced no
later than eight years from the date on which the product was first
purchased for use or consumption. The court then stated that section
12.250 unambiguously states that it has no application outside of Chapter
12. Therefore, the municipal corporation was not exempt from the eightyear statute of repose for Shasta's product liability claim by way of section
12.250.
The court added a further inquiry to the two certified questions. It
looked at if a common law variation of section 12.250 existed to make
Shasta's action timely. In Oregon, as a matter of public policy, general
statutes of limitations did not run against the government unless the statute
expressly provided otherwise. The court found this rule necessary to
preserve public rights, revenues, and property from injury and loss by the
negligence of public officers. Statutes of repose started to run on the date
on which a product first was purchased for use or consumption, not on the
date on which a purchaser knows or should have known of an injury
caused by the product. The eight-year statute of ultimate repose ran
despite whether a public official failed to assert a claim in a timely manner.
Therefore, the court found that the public policy for exempting government
from statutes of limitations did not apply to statutes of repose.
Elaine Soltis

